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[Sac. No. 5684. In Bank. May 4, 1945.)

BILI.JY BURGESS, a Minor,etc. et al., Appellants, v. SAll.IDEL A. CAHILL et al., Defendants; H. P. GARIN
COMP ANY (n (;orTlOrntion). Ff''Ipondent.
[1] Trial-Direction of Verdict-Condition of Evidence Authorizing.-A court may direct a verdict in favor of defendant ollly
when, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving plaintiff's
evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, indulging
.in every legitimate inference which may be drawn therefrom,
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in his favor.
[2] :Automobiles-Persons Liable-Lender-Purpose of Statute.It is the legislative purpose of Veh. Code, § 402, to protect
innocent third persons from the careless use of automobiles,
and to make this protection paramount to the rights of an
owner who has permitted the use of his ear by others even
though he, personally, is not guilty of negligence.
[8] ld. - Persons Liable - Lender - Purpose of Statute. - Veh.
Code, § 402, defines an automobile owner's liability in cases
where the principle of respondeat 6f,tperior is inapplicable, in
order to make him liable for the negligence of any person to
whom he has expressly or impliedly given permission to oper-

)

[lJ See 24 CaLJur. 913.
[2] See 2 Ca1.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 478; 5 Am.Jur. 697.
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Trial, § 257; [2-4] Automobiles,
1181(1).; [6] A,1domobiles, § 167(4); [6] Automobiles, 1167(6).
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ate his car, and thus prevellt him from escaping liability by
say~ng that his car was not being used in his bm;inesR or wn~
being operated without his authority.
[4] ld. - Persons Liable-Lender-Foundation of Statutory Liability.-The foundation of an automobile owner's liabilit,'
under Veh. Code, ~ 402, is the permission given to another t;i
use an instrnmentality whir-h. if improperly nsed, is a dangeJ'
and menace to the public.
.
[6] ld. -- Persons Liable-Lender-Possession by Employee-Permission.-In an action for personal injuries sustained in a
collision with defendant's automobile while being used by its
employee, it was reversible error to direct a verdict in favor
of the owner on the ground that there was no 8ubstantialevidenee of permission to the employee to use the car, where it
was shown that the car was at the time of the accident being
used by the employee without restrictions, and without eJJort
by the owner to check the mileage· or the amount of gasoline
used.
[6] ld.-Persons Liable'-Lender-PossessioD by PersoD to Whom
Permittee Entrusted Car.-Where the owner of an automobile
permits its 1;lse and it is being driven by another with the CODsent of the permittee, who accompanies the driver, the owner
is liable for the driver's negligence to the extent set forth in
Veh. Code, §402.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County. C. W. Miller, Judge. Reversed.
Action against driver and owner of an automobile for damages for personal injuries and for wrongful death resulting
from an automobile collision. Judgment in favor of owner
pursuant to a directed verdict, reversed.
Gumpert & Mazzera and Charles A. Zeller for Appellants.
Neumiller & Ditz and C. H. Hogan for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-Plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment ...
for the defendant H. P. Garin Co. entered pursuant to a
directed verdict. No appeal was taken from the separate
judgments eptered for the plaintiffs against the other defendants.
.
[1] The settled rule is that a court may direct a ver.dict
only when, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving plaintiffs' evidence all the value to which it iI legally entitled,
16 c...24-I&
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indulging in every legitimatc inference which may be drawn
therefrom, the result is a determinatioll that thcre is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor
of the plaintiffs. (Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397, 400 r14 P.2d
768]; Estate of Flood, 2]7 Cal. 763, 768[21 P.2d 579]; B·urlingham v. Gray, 22 Cal.2d 87, 94 [137 P.2d 9].) Viewing the
evidence in accordan<>e witll the rule. the following fact~
appear:
The. defendant H. P. Garin Co. was engaged in a farming
enterprise on Bouldin and other islands situated about eight
miles northwest of Stockton. In 1942 this defendant employed
Samuel Cahill as a mechanic to keep its farm machinery in
repair. The company provided Cahill with a Ford pickup
truck for his exclusive use while in its employ. The car was
garaged at Cahill's home. It was used on many occasions
for his personal business. and at least once on a fishing trip
to Bouldin Island. The company furnished the oil and gasoline for the car but made no effort to check the mileage or
the amount of fuel consumed. Printed stickers were attached
to some of the company's cars prohibiting the use of the
machines for private purposes, but none was attached to the
ear in the possession of Cahill. On January 17, 1943, at 7
o'clock p. m., Cahill, his wife and son, were riding in the car
for the purpose of obtaining some plants and shrubs to be
planted at the site of a new home. On this trip, and while
Mrs. Cahill was driving, a collision occurred between the car '
and an automobile driven by Utah R. Thornburgh. AB a result of the accident Thornburgh and another person in his car
were killed and others seriously injured.
An issue arose on the trial as to whether Cahill was ex~
pressly prohibited from using the car for his personal purposes, and therefore whether he had permission for its general
use. Cahill testified that he at no time received instructions,
either oral or written, restricting its use to company business.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury
to return a verdict in favor of the defendant company on the
ground that there was no substantial evidence that the Ford
pickup was being operated at the tinle of the accident with the
permission of the owner of the vehicle. The jury returned
a verdict' in compliance with that instruction and judgment
was entered accordingly.
The assertea liability of the defendant corporation is based
on aection 402 of. the Vehicle Oode, which provides in part:

May 1945J

BURUESS V. CAHILL

323

[26 C.2d 320; 158 P.2d 393J

)

)

"Every owner of a motor vehicle lli liable and responsible
lor the death of or injury to person or property resultIng from
negligence ill the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any perSOll using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such
owner, and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to
the owner for all purposes of civil damages."
It becomes necessary to determine whether the trial court
correctly ruled that there was insufficient evidence to go to the
jury on the question of permission of the employer for the
general use of the car by the defendant Cahill.
Prior to the enactment of the imputed liability statute the
general rule was that the owner of an automobile who was not
present at the time of the negligent act which caused injury
to a third person could not be held liable unless it was shown
that the person in charge was the agent or servant of the owner
and at the time was engaged in his service. (Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684 [214 P. 42].)
[2] A reading of the language of the statute and a review
of the decisions in this state reveal that the legislative purpose
in the enactment of section 1714% of the Civil Code (now section 402 of the Vehicle Code), was to protect innocent third
parties from the careless use of automobiles and that this
protection should be paramount to the rights of. an owner
who has permitted the use of his car by others even though he,
personally, was not guilty of negligence. The wording of the
statute is clear and indicates that purpose. [8] The statute
defines the owner's liability in cases where the principle of
respondeat superior is inapplicable, in order to make the owner
liable for the negligence of any person to whom he had expressly or impliedly given permission to operate his car.
(Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454, 457 [139 P. 645, 147 A.L.R.
861], citing Bayless v. Mull, 50 Cal.App.2d 66 [122 P.2d 608] ;
Plaumbo v. Ryan, 213 App.Div. 517 [210 N.Y.S. 225].) The
legislation was plainly intended to enlarge the liability of the
nonculpable owner of a motor vehicle for its operation on a
public highway. [4] The foundation of the statutory liability is the permission given to another to use an instrumentality which if improperly used is a danger and menace to the
public.
.
In construing the statute earlier cases have seemed to turn
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on the question of knowledge 01' information 011 the part of
the owner that the vehicle was bein~ driven by the perSOll
with whose negligence he is sought to be charged, before implied permission could be inferreJ. For exalllple, in Howland v. Doyle, 6 Cal.App.2d 311 [44 P.2r1 453], it was sDid:
"A persoll cannot be said to have permitted that of which
he had no knowledge or information," citing Bradford v'.
Sargent, 135 CaLApp. 324, 332 [27 P.2d 93]. But in Burford
v. Huesby, 35 Cal.App.2d 643 [96 P.2d 380], it was recognized
that prior knowledge was not necessary in order that implied
. permission be inferred, and that knowledge or information of
the intendeG use of the car had referenC'C' to the eJement of
"express" as opposed to "impJied" consent.
The defendant relics on the cases of Henrietta v. Evans, 10
Cal.2d 526 [75 P.2d 1051], and Engsil'orn v. Auburn Auto.
Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77 P.2d 1059], where it was held
that use by the permittee beyond certain express restrictions
was without permission. They are not determinative here.
There was no question in those cases of either express or implied permission for general use.
[5] Here the employer and employee relationship existed.
The defendant employer gave exclilsive possession and permission for the use of the vehiele to its employee, and, according to the testimony lI10st favorable to the plaintiff, without
restrictions upon its use, without effort to check the mileage,
or the consumption of gasoline or otherwise supervise or
limit the use of the car.
Evidence of employer and employee relationship together
with the other factors mentioned would support an inference
that the vehicle was being driven with the permission of the
owner. (Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457 [126 P.2d 868J;
Hicks v. Reis, 21 Cal.2d 654. 659 [134 P.2d 788], and cases
cited. ) Those cases involved a similar relationship and evidence on the issue of permissive use. In the case of Blank v.
Ooffin a judgment entered on a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant owner was reversed. It was held in the Hicks case
on the appeal from the judgment against the owner, that the
trier of the facts was justified in inferring that permission

existed.
The defendant owner refers at length to evidence in its
favor and in confii('t with the evidence favorable to the plaintiff. The presence in the record of such conflicting evidence
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is l'eDdily cOllceded but it mny not influence t]le result on an
appeal of this charactpr.
[6] The fact thnt at Ill(' tim!' of the RP('id(,llt the wif(' of
the defendant Cahill was operating the vehicle WOll1d not defent recoyery-. Mr. Cahill was in the car and his wife was
driving with his C'OJll'Wllt. If an automobile i.~ ]wing dl'i\,{~11 by
another with the consent of the permittee, where th(' permittf'€'
nccompanies the driyer. th(' owner is lia hIe to t h(' ext(,111 set
forth in section 402 of the Vehicle Codp. (Hicks v. Reis,
supra; Sutton v. Tanger, 1]5 Cn1.App. 267 [1 P.2d 521];
Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal.App.2d 349 f37 P.2d 99];
Annstrong v. Sengo, 17 Cal.App.2d 300 [61 P.2il 118FQ. (Jf.
Souza v. Oortis, supm.)
It follows that a directed verdict was improperly ordered.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal and
agree that the evidence was sufficient to justify the trier of
fact in determining that the H. P. Garin Co. had given its
consent to the operation by Cahill of the Ford pickup truck at
the time and place of the accident which is the subject of this
action. In my opinion it was not necessary for plaintiffs to go
further than to establish the fact that the automobile carne into
Cahill's possession lawfully, and that he had the permission
of the owner to operate it upon the highway, in order to
fasten liability upon the owner for damages resulting from
its negligent operation.
The language. of section 402 of the Vehicle Code is clear and
is not susceptible to the interpretation that an owner may give
his permission to the operation by a third person of his automobile upon a public highway and restrict his liability for
the negligent operation thereof by limiting such operation
to time ot' place. The obvious purpose of the Legislature in
the enactment of said section was to protect persons who might ....
be injure;d as the result of the negligent operation of automobiles by persons other than the owners thereof who are operating the same with the permission of such owners. When a person entrusts the operation of his automibile to a third person
out of his presence, he has placed in the hands of such third
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person an instrumentality which may be used to cause injury
or Jeath to innocent persons who may become victims of his
negligent use of such instrumentality. For this reason, the
Legislature wisely saw fit to place liability upon the owner
for such negligent operation. If the Legislature had intended
that the owner should have the right to limit his liability by
restricting the operation of such automobile to a specific time
or place, it could have so stated, but it did not do so for obvious reasons. The protection which the statute was designed
to afford would be clearly reduced by permitting the owner
to so limit his liability. The owner can protect himself by
insurance against any risk he may assume by permitting the
operation of his automobile by third persons, while a victim
of the negligent operation of such automobile suffers the same
loss whether the automobile is being operated with or without
the permission of the owner.
In my opinion such cases as Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Ca1.2d
526 [75 P.2d 1051], and Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales
Corp., 11 Ca1.2d 64 r77 P.2cl 1059], are contrary to the intention clearly expressed by the Legislature by its enactment of
section 402 of the Vehicle Code and should be overruled. The
views expressed by the court in those cases indicates that the
trend of the philosophy of the law at that time was to protect
the owner of the automobile who voluntarily permitted a third
person to make such use of it that an innocent victim was
caused to suffer damages which would not have occurred except for the owner's voluntary act in permitting the use of
such instrumentality by a third person. In my opinion the
Henrietta and Engstrom cases were erroneously decided. The
basic concept and philosophy underlying these decisions is out
of harmony with the purpose and object of the legislation embraced within section 402 of the Vehicle Code, and this court
should now declare the law to be that owners of automobiles
who voluntarily permit their operation by third persons are
liabll3 to per~ns who suffer injuries as the result of the negligent operation of such automobiles regardless of whether the
persons operating sucn automobiles violate the instructions
of the owner. as to time, place, or manner of such operation .

)

. EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal upon
the ground tpat the evidence upon the issue of Cahill's permission to use the tl'llck at the time of the injury presented a
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question of fact fo1' the oetel'lllillatiull 01 the jury. But in
reaching that conclusion, Mr. Justice Shenk states that the
cases ofJIem'ietia Y. Evans, JO Ca1.2d 52G[75 P.2d JOG1], and
EnrJstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77 P.2d
JOG!)], are not determinative of the present controversy. T1I:1t
statcrnent is correct. in my judgment, but not because, as he
said: "There was no question in' t.hose' cases of r1111er exprrss
or implied permission for general use."
In the Hrnriet1.a casr t.his court. held: "On [principle 1,
there is no fUl1darnental ground of distinction between a limitation of t.ime and Olle of purpose or place, in so far as permission is concerned; and it. would seem clear that. a substantial violation of either limitat.ion terminates the original express consent and makes t.he subsequent use without permission. For example, an owner might entrust his car to another for the purpose of driving it to his home, or to a garage
for repairs; and if the driver took the car out on a pleasure
trip, it could hardly be contended that he was acting with
the permission of the owner." The second decision affirmed
a judgment for the defendant. As the only permission given
Herndon to use the car was that he might have it for the
particularly specified period, said the court, when that time
had expired, he was not then driving it with the permission,
either express or implied, of the owner.
Were the court now considerIng a judgment rendered upon
evidence showing, without conflict, that the truck of the Garin
Company was turned over to Cahill solely for his use in going
to and from the company's place of business and not to be
driven on Sundays for personal errands, the rule of the prior
decisions would require a determination that the owner was
not liable for damages because of the accident. But the only'
issue now presented is whether the directed verdict was proper.

